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WINNING STRATEGY FOR THE MULTIPLAYER AND MULTIALLIANCE
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STEVEN J. MILLER, CLAYTON MIZGERD, VASHISTH TIWARI, JINGKAI YE,
AND XIAOYAN ZHENG
Abstract. Edouard Zeckendorf proved that every positive integer n can be uniquely written
[Ze] as the sum of non-adjacent Fibonacci numbers, known as the Zeckendorf decomposition.
Based on Zeckendorf’s decomposition, we have the Zeckendorf game for multiple players. We
show that when the Zeckendorf game has at least 3 players, none of the players have a winning
strategy for n ≥ 5. Then we extend the multi-player game to the multi-alliance game, finding
some interesting situations in which no alliance has a winning strategy. This includes the
two-alliance game, and some cases in which one alliance always has a winning strategy.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Rules of Zeckendorf Game. The Fibonacci sequence is one of the most fabulous se-
quences with a number of beautiful properties. Among these properties is a theorem by
Edouard Zeckendorf [Ze]. Zeckendorf proved that every positive integer n can be uniquely
written as the sum of distinct non-consecutive Fibonacci numbers. This sum is also known as
the Zeckendorf decomposition of n. We define the Fibonacci sequence as F1 = 1, F2 = 2, F3 = 3,
and Fn+1 = Fn + Fn−1. If we stuck with F1 = F2 = 1, we lose uniqueness.
Baird-Smith, Epstein, Flint and Miller [BEFM1, BEFM2] created a game based on the
Zeckendorf decomposition. We quote from [BEFM2] to describe its rules.
Date: September 9, 2020.
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We first introduce some notation. By {1n} or {F1
n} we mean n copies of 1, or F1. If we
have 3 copies of F1, 2 copies of F2, and 7 copies of F4, we write either {F1
3 + F2
2 + F4
7} or
{13 + 22 + 57}.
Definition 1.1 (The Zeckendorf Game). At the beginning of the game, there is an unordered
list of n 1’s. Let F1 = 1, F2 = 2, and Fi+1 = Fi + Fi−1; therefore the initial list is {F1
n}. On
each turn, a player can do one of the following moves.
(1) If the list contains two consecutive Fibonacci numbers, Fi−1, Fi, these can be combined
to create Fi+1. We denote this move by Fi−1 + Fi = Fi+1.
(2) If the list has two of the same Fibonacci number, Fi, Fi, then
(a) if i = 1, F1, F1 can be combined to create F2, denoted by 1 + 1 = 2,
(b) if i = 2, a player can change F2, F2 to F1, F3, denoted by 2 + 2 = 1 + 3, and
(c) if i ≥ 3, a player can change Fi, Fi to Fi−2, Fi+1, denoted by Fi+Fi = Fi−2+Fi+1.
The players alternate moving. The game ends when one player moves to create the Zeckendorf
decomposition.
In the following results, p represents the number of players in the Zeckendorf game.
1.2. Previous Results. Baird-Smith, Epstein, Flint and Miller [BEFM2] proved the following
results in the Zeckendorf game.
Theorem 1.2. Every game terminates in a finite number of moves at the Zeckendorf decom-
position.
Theorem 1.3. In the two-player game (p = 2), for any n > 2, player 2 always has a winning
strategy.
It is worth noting that the proof on Theorem 1.3 is non-constructive, and it is still an open
problem to find the constructive winning strategy of player 2.
1.3. New Results.
Theorem 1.4. When n ≥ 5, for any p ≥ 3 no player has a winning strategy.
Now we extend the multi-player games to the game of more than two alliances, or teams.
We use t to represent the number of teams. We then have the following theorems.
Theorem 1.5. For any n ≥ 2k2+4k and t ≥ 3, if each team has exactly k = t− 1 consecutive
players, then no team has a winning strategy.
Theorem 1.6. Let n ≥ 30 and p = 6. If one alliance has 4 players and the other alliance has
2 players, then the 4-player alliance always has a winning strategy.
Theorem 1.7. Let n ≥ 32 and p ≥ 7. If there are two alliances, one alliance with p−2 players
(called the big alliance), and the other with exactly 2 players (called the small alliance), then
the big alliance always has a winning strategy.
Lastly, we extend this to larger alliances with the following theorems.
Theorem 1.8. For any n ≥ 4pb + 2p − 2b, if one alliance contains more than two-thirds of
the players and there is some integer b such that if a player i is not on the alliance, player
(i − b) mod p is on it, and the alliance has at least 2b players in a row, then that alliance has
a winning strategy.
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Theorem 1.9. Let n ≥ 2p+4b. If there is some integer b such that if a player i is not on the
alliance then player (i− b) mod p is on the alliance, and the alliance has at least 3b players in
a row, then that alliance has a winning strategy.
Theorem 1.10. Assume we have one big alliance (sized 2d) and one small alliance (sized d).
In this two-alliance game consisting of 3d players (d can be any positive integer), when the
small alliance consists of d consecutive players and the big alliance consists of 2d consecutive
players, if n ≥ 12d2 + 4d, then the big alliance always has a winning strategy.
2. Winning Strategy for Zeckendorf Game
2.1. Proof Of Theorem 1.4. Note: In all the following proofs of this section, player 0 =
player p (under mod p).
To prove Theorem 1.4, we introduce the following property:
Property 1. Suppose player m has a winning strategy (1 ≤ m ≤ p). For any p ≥ 3, if player
m is not the player who takes step 2 listed below, then any winning path of player m does not
contain the following 3 consecutive steps:
Step 1 : 1 + 1 = 2.
Step 2 : 1 + 1 = 2.
Step 3 : 2 + 2 = 1 + 3.
Proof. Suppose player m has a winning strategy and there is a winning path that contains
these 3 consecutive steps. Then there exists a player a where 1 ≤ a ≤ p, a 6= m, such that
player a − 1 (mod p) can take step 1, player a can take step 2 and player a + 1 (mod p) can
take step 3.
Note that instead of doing 1+1 = 2, player a can do 1+2 = 3. Then player m− 1 (mod p)
has winning strategy, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, by using stealing strategy, Property 1 holds. 
We now prove Theorem 1.4 by splitting it into the following 2 lemmas, Lemma 2.1 and
Lemma 2.2.
Lemma 2.1. When n ≥ 13, for any p ≥ 4 no player has a winning strategy.
Proof. Suppose player m has a winning strategy (1 ≤ m ≤ p).
Consider the following two cases.
Case 1. If m ≥ 4, then player 1, 2, 3 can do the following:
Player 1 : 1 + 1 = 2.
Player 2 : 1 + 1 = 2.
Player 3 : 2 + 2 = 1 + 3.
This contradicts Property 1, so player m does not have winning strategy for any
m ≥ 4.
Case 2. If m ≤ 3, then after player m’s first move, player m + 1,m + 2,m + 3 can do the
following:
Player m+ 1 : 1 + 1 = 2.
Player m+ 2 : 1 + 1 = 2.
Player m+ 3 : 2 + 2 = 1 + 3.
This contradicts Property 1, so player m does not have winning strategy for any
m ≤ 3.
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By Case 1 and Case 2, Lemma 2.1 is proved. 
Lemma 2.2. When n ≥ 13, for p = 3 no player has a winning strategy.
Proof. Suppose player m has a winning strategy (1 ≤ m ≤ 3).
After player m’s first move, players m+1 and m+2 can do the following (if m = 3, we can
start the following process from the first step of the game):
Player m+ 1 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 1).
Player m+ 2 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 2).
Player m: player m can do anything (Step 3).
Note that if player m does 2 + 2 = 1+ 3, then Steps 1, 2, and 3 violate Property 1, which is
a contradiction.
If player m does anything else other than 2 + 2 = 1 + 3, then after player m’s first move,
the other 2 players can do the following (continuing after the first 3 steps listed above with 2
more steps; if m = 3, player m+ 1 is player 1):
Player m+ 1 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 1).
Player m+ 2 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 2).
Player m: player m can do anything (Step 3).
Player m+ 1 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 4).
Player m+ 2 : 2 + 2 = 1 + 3 (Step 5).
Note that Step 3 removes at most one 2, but Step 1 and Step 2 generate two 2’s in total, so
there will be at least one 2 remaining after step 3. Therefore, player m + 1 can do 1 + 2 = 3
instead in Step 4. By doing so, now player m − 1 (mod p) has winning strategy, which is a
contradiction.
Thus by using a stealing strategy, Lemma 2.2 is proved. 
By Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, and brute force computations for n < 13, Theorem 1.4 is proved.
2.2. Proof Of Theorem 1.5. For the following proofs, team 0 = team t (under mod t).
Note that player tk’s next player is player 1, and we regard player tk and player 1 as two
consecutive players. Therefore, without loss of generality, in all the following proofs, we assume
that team 1 has player 1, 2, 3, . . . , k; team 2 has player k + 1, k + 2, . . . , 2k; team 3 has player
2k + 1, 2k + 2, . . . , 3k and so on.
For this proof we utilize the following property.
Property 2. Suppose team m has a winning strategy (1 ≤ m ≤ t). For any t ≥ 3 and k = t−1,
if none of the middle k players listed below belong to team m, then any winning path for team
m does not contain the following 3k consecutive steps:
First k players all do: 1 + 1 = 2.
Middle k players all do: 1 + 1 = 2.
Last k players all do: 2 + 2 = 1 + 3.
Proof. Suppose team m has a winning strategy and there is a winning path for team m that
contains such 3k consecutive steps. Then ∃ q (1 ≤ q ≤ p) such that player q belongs to team
m and takes the last step of the game.
For the middle k players, instead of doing 1 + 1 = 2, they can all do 1 + 2 = 3.
By doing so, player q − k now becomes the player who takes the last step.
Note that team m has k players, so player q − k belongs to team m− 1 (mod t).
So team m− 1( mod t) has winning strategy, which contradicts with our assumption.
Therefore, by using stealing strategy, it is proved that Property 2 holds. 
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After proving Property 2, we prove Theorem 1.5 by splitting it into the following 2 lemmas:
Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4.
Lemma 2.3. When n ≥ 2k2 + 4k, for any t ≥ 4 and k = t− 1 no team has winning strategy.
Proof. Suppose team m has a winning strategy (1 ≤ m ≤ t).
Note that the last player in team m is player mk, so the first player after team m is player
mk + 1 (mod p).
Also, since there are t−1 = k other teams, and each team has k players, where k ≥ 4−1 = 3.
Therefore, there are k2 ≥ 3k consecutive players from other teams. After all the members of
team m’s first move, the consecutive t− 1 = k other teams can do the following:
(If m = t, we start the following steps from the first step of player 1.) In all the following,
given players’ numbers are mod p.
From player mk + 1 to (m+ 1)k all do: 1 + 1 = 2.
From player (m+ 1)k + 1 to player (m+ 2)k all do: 1 + 1 = 2.
From player (m+ 2)k + 1 to player (m+ 3)k all do: 2 + 2 = 1 + 3.
Since all these 3k players are not from team m, it contradicts with property 2, so team m
does not have winning strategy. Therefore, Lemma 2.3 is proved. 
Lemma 2.4. When n ≥ 30, for any t = 3 and k = 2 no team has winning strategy.
Proof. Suppose team m has a winning strategy (1 ≤ m ≤ 3). Note that the game has 3 teams
and 6 players in total, so all the players’ numbers listed below are under mod 6, and all the
teams’ numbers listed below are under mod 3. Team m + 1 has players 2m + 1 and 2m + 2;
team m− 1 has players 2m+ 3 and 2m+ 4; team m has players 2m− 1 and 2m.
After player 2m’s (last player from team m) first move, let’s do the following first:
(if m = 3, the same following process can start from the first step of player 1.)
Player 2m+ 1 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 1).
Player 2m+ 2 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 2).
Player 2m+ 3 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 3).
Player 2m+ 4 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 4).
Player 2m− 1 : anything (Step 5).
Player 2m : anything (Step 6).
Player 2m+ 1 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 7).
Player 2m+ 2 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 8).
Player 2m+ 3 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 9).
Player 2m+ 4 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 10).
Player 2m− 1 : anything (Step 11).
Player 2m : anything (Step 12).
(Note: step 5, 6, 11, 12 can be anything because they are controlled by team m.)
Now we prove this lemma in 2 cases.
Case 1. If step 5, 6 are both 2 + 2 = 1 + 3, then look at steps 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
This contradicts with property 2, so team m has no winning strategy.
Similarly, if step 11, 12 are both 2 + 2 = 1 + 3, then look at steps 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.
This contradicts with property 2, so team m has no winning strategy.
Case 2. Otherwise, if one of the steps from 5, 6 is not 2 + 2 = 1 + 3, and one of the steps from
11, 12 is not 2 + 2 = 1 + 3, then let’s do the following after player 2m’s first move
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(continuing after first 12 steps with 4 more steps; if m = 3, the same following process
can start from the very first step of player 1):
Player 2m+ 1 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 1).
Player 2m+ 2 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 2).
Player 2m+ 3 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 3).
Player 2m+ 4 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 4).
Player 2m− 1 : anything (Step 5).
Player 2m : anything (Step 6).
Player 2m+ 1 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 7).
Player 2m+ 2 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 8).
Player 2m+ 3 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 9).
Player 2m+ 4 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 10).
Player 2m− 1 : anything (Step 11).
Player 2m : anything (Step 12).
Player 2m+ 1 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 13).
Player 2m+ 2 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 14).
Player 2m+ 3 : 2 + 2 = 1 + 3 (Step 15).
Player 2m+ 4 : 2 + 2 = 1 + 3 (Step 16).
Note that one of the steps from 5, 6 is not 2 + 2 = 1 + 3, and one of the steps
from 11, 12 is not 2 + 2 = 1 + 3, so steps 5, 6 will take away at most three “2’s” in
total, and steps 11, 12 will take away at most three “2’s” in total. Also note that steps
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 generate eight “2’s” in total. So after step 12, there will be at
least two 2’s remaining.
Therefore, for player 2m+ 1 and 2m+ 2, instead of doing 1 + 1 = 2, they can both
do 1 + 2 = 3.
Since team m has winning strategy, either player 2m− 1 or player 2m takes the last
step.
If player 2m−1 originally takes the last step, by using the stealing strategy mentioned
above, now player 2m − 1 − 2 = 2m − 3 now takes the last step, which means that
player 2m + 3 now takes the last step. So team m − 1 now has the winning strategy,
which contradicts with our assumption.
If player 2m originally takes the last step, by using the stealing strategy mentioned
above, now player 2m−2 now takes the last step, which means that player 2m+4 now
takes the last step. So team m − 1 now has the winning strategy, which contradicts
with our assumption.
In both cases, we can find contradiction by using stealing strategy, so Lemma 2.4 is proved.

Therefore, by Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4, Theorem 1.5 is proved.
2.3. Proof Of Theorem 1.6. Note: in the following proof, since player 6’s next player is
player 1, player 6 and player 1 are considered as two consecutive players.
The 4-player alliance has 3 possible cases.
Case 1. If the 4-player alliance consists of 4 consecutive players, then the 2-player alliance will
also be 2 consecutive players.
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To show that the 2-player alliance does not actually have a winning strategy, the 4
consecutive players in the big alliance can be regarded as 2 teams, where each team
has 2 consecutive players.
Therefore, according to Lemma 2.4, the 2-player alliance does not have a winning
strategy.
Therefore, the 4-player alliance always has a winning strategy in this case.
Case 2 . If the 4-player alliance is separated in two parts, and each part has 2 consecutive
players.
Note that this situation is equivalent to the 3-player game situation, where 2 of them
are in the same team now.
According to Lemma 2.2, the single player in the 3-player game does not have a
winning strategy.
Equivalently, the 2-player alliance does not have a winning strategy in this case.
Therefore, the 4-player alliance always has a winning strategy in this case.
Case 3 . If the 4-player alliance is separated in two parts, where one part has 3 consecutive
players and the other part only has 1 player.
Then, the 2 players in the 2-player alliance are separated from each other (if they are
not separated, then the 4 players of the 4-player alliance will be 4 consecutive players).
Suppose the 2-player alliance has a winning strategy, then there always exists a
player q from the 2-player alliance who takes the last step.
Suppose the 3 consecutive players in the 4 player alliance are player a, a+1 (mod 6),
a+ 2 (mod 6). Then let’s do the following from player a’s first move:
Player a : 1 + 1 = 2.
Player a+ 1 : 1 + 1 = 2.
Player a+ 2 : 2 + 2 = 1 + 3.
Note that if player a + 1 does 1 + 2 = 3 instead, then player q − 1 will now be the
player who takes the last step. Since 2 players of the 2-player alliance are separated,
player q − 1 belongs to the 4-player alliance. Therefore, the 4-player alliance now has
the winning strategy, which contradicts with our assumption.
Therefore, by using stealing strategy, we proved that the 4-player alliance has a
winning strategy in this case.
Thus by Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3, Theorem 1.6 follows.
2.4. Proof Of Theorem 1.7. We look at the case of 7-player game first.
Lemma 2.5. When n ≥ 32, if one alliance has 5 players and the other alliance has 2 players,
then the 5-player alliance always has a winning strategy.
Proof. We prove this lemma by considering 2 cases.
Case 1. If the 2 players in the 2-player alliance are not 2 consecutive players, then the 5-
player alliance will be separated by 2 parts (considering player 7 and player 1 as two
consecutive players).
According to the pigeonhole principle, one of these 2 parts will contain at least 3
consecutive players (we call this part “large part”).
Suppose the 2-player alliance has a winning strategy, then there exists a player q
from the 2-player alliance who takes the last step.
TBD 7
THE FIBONACCI QUARTERLY
Suppose the first player in the large part is player a, then starting from player a’s
first move, let’s do the following:
Player a : 1 + 1 = 2.
Player a+ 1 : 1 + 1 = 2.
Player a+ 2 : 2 + 2 = 1 + 3.
Note that instead of doing 1 + 1 = 2, player a + 1 can do 1 + 2 = 3. Then player
q − 1 is the player who takes the last step of the winning path.
Since the 2 players in the 2-player alliance are not consecutive, player q − 1 belongs
to the 5-player alliance.
As a result, the 5-player alliance now has the winning strategy, which contradicts
our assuption.
Therefore, by using the stealing strategy, we proved that the 5-player alliance has
the winning strategy in this case.
Case 2. If the 2 players in the 2-player alliance are consecutive, then the 5 players in the 5-player
are also consecutive.
Suppose that the 5 consecutive players of the 5-player alliance starts with player a.
Then starting with player a’s first move, let’s do the following:
Player a : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 1).
Player a+ 1 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 2).
Player a+ 2 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 3).
Player a+ 3 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 4).
Player a+ 4 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 5).
Player a+ 5 : anything (Step 6).
Player a+ 6 : anything (Step 7).
(Note that player a+ 5 and player a+ 6 are in the 2-player alliance.)
Player a : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 8).
Player a+ 1 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 9).
Player a+ 2 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 10).
Player a+ 3 : 2 + 2 = 1 + 3 (Step 11).
Player a+ 4 : 2 + 2 = 1 + 3 (Step 12).
Suppose the 2-player alliance has a winning strategy, then there always exists a
player q from the 2-player alliance who takes the last step.
Note that step 6 and step 7 can take away at most four 2’s in total, and steps
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 have generated six 2’s in total.
As a result, after step 8, there will be at least two 2’s remaining.
Therefore, player a+ 1 in step 9 and player a+ 2 in step 10 can both do 1 + 2 = 3
instead. Then player q − 2 becomes the player who takes the last step.
Since 2 players of the 2-player alliance are consecutive, player q − 2 belongs to the
5-player alliance. Therefore, the 5-player alliance now has the winning strategy, which
contradicts with our assumption.
Therefore, by using stealing strategy, Case 2 is proved.
Thus by our analysis in Case 1 and Case 2, Lemma 2.5 is proved. 
Now let’s look at the game of 8 or more players.
Lemma 2.6. In a p-player game with 2 alliances, when n is significantly large (n ≥ 22) and
p ≥ 8, if one alliance has p− 2 players (let’s call it big alliance, which has at least 6 players),
and the other alliance has 2 players, then the big alliance always has a winning strategy.
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Proof. We prove this lemma by considering 2 cases.
Case 1. If the 2 players of the 2-player alliance are not consecutive, then the big alliance will
be separated by 2 parts.
Note that the big alliance has at least 6 players. By pigeonhole principle, there will
be at least one part having at least 3 players (let’s call it big part).
Suppose 2-player alliance has a winning strategy. Then for any winning path, there
exists a player q in the 2-player alliance who takes the last step.
Suppose the first player in the big part is player a, and let’s do the following starting
from player a’s first move:
Player a : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 1).
Player a+ 1 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 2).
Player a+ 2 : 2 + 2 = 1 + 3 (Step 3).
Note that instead of doing 1 + 1 = 2, player a+ 1 can do 1 + 2 = 3 instead in step
2. Now player q − 1 becomes the player who takes the last step. Since the 2 players
in the 2-player alliance are not consecutive, player q − 1 belongs to the big alliance, so
the big alliance now has the winning strategy, which contradicts with our assumption.
Therefore, we proved case 1 by using stealing strategy.
Case 2. If the 2 players of the 2-player alliance are consecutive, then the p − 2 players of the
big alliance are consecutive.
Suppose 2-player alliance has a winning strategy, then for any winning path, there
exists a player q from the 2-player alliance who takes the last step.
Suppose the big alliance’s p− 2 consecutive players start with player a.
(Note the the big alliance has at least 6 players, so players a, a+1, a+2, a+3, a+4, a+5
are all in the big alliance).
Let’s do the following starting from player a’s first move:
Player a : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 1).
Player a+ 1 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 2).
Player a+ 2 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 3).
Player a+ 3 : 1 + 1 = 2 (Step 4).
Player a+ 4 : 2 + 2 = 1 + 3 (Step 5).
Player a+ 5 : 2 + 2 = 1 + 3 (Step 6).
Note that player a + 2 in step 3 and player a + 3 in step 4 can both do 1 + 2 = 3
instead.
If they both do so, then player q−2 becomes the player who takes the last step. Since
the 2 players in the 2-player alliance are consecutive, player q − 2 belongs to the big
alliance. Therefore, the big alliance now has the winning strategy, which contradicts
with our assumption.
By using the stealing strategy, we proved case 2.
Thus by our analysis in Case 1 and Case 2, Lemma 2.6 is proved. 
By Lemmas 2.5 and 2.6, Theorem 1.7 is proved.
2.5. Proof Of Theorem 1.8. Say we have an alliance a with over two-thirds of the players.
For a sufficiently large n, it can then force the creation of an arbitrary number of 2’s eventually,
as players on the alliance can each produce at least one per round: if each plays 1 + 1 = 2,
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opposed players can each remove only two per round by playing 2 + 2 = 1 + 3, meaning each
round, alliance a can net increase the number of 2’s by at least one.
As such, at some point, alliance a can force the creation of at least b 2’s. By assumption,
alliance a has at least 2b subsequent players. Say we have at least b 2’s and are about to begin
the turns of those players.
The first b players could all play 1+1 = 2, and the next b players could all play 2+2 = 1+3,
as the first b players would create b 2’s and the next b players would use up those and the
preexisting b 2’s. Let us say the turn after this is turn 2b, changing what we call turn 0 to
make this the case.
Now assume the opposing players have a winning strategy. In that case, after this, there
would be a winning strategy from the resultant state for an alliance that goes when the opposed
players do. In particular, this alliance goes on turns 2b+p1, 2b+p2, 2b+p3, . . . , 2b+pn, where
p1, p2, . . . are some numbers selected to make this the case.
Now, note that the 2b players can instead play as follows: the first b can all play 1 + 2 = 3,
resulting in the same state as the one we got to after all 2b players last time. As such, the
same strategy as the one used previously gives the win to the alliance that goes on turns
b+ p1, b+ p2, b+ p3, . . . , b+ pn.
By assumption, alliance a has all players b before a player from the opposition. We know
the players with turns 2b + p1, 2b + p2, 2b + p3, . . . , 2b + pn are opposed to alliance a, so the
players with turns b+ p1, b+ p2, b+ p3, . . . , b+ pn must be on alliance a.
As such, this would be a winning strategy for alliance a, contradicting the assumption that
the opposed players have a winning strategy. As such, alliance a must have a winning strategy.
2.6. Proof Of Theorem 1.9. Assume we have an alliance a with 3b consecutive players at
some point, and n ≥ 2p+ 4b.
First, let’s examine the first turn of the 3b players. As n is at least 2p + 4b, regardless of
when they start, there will be at least enough 1’s in the game for the first 2b of them to play
1 + 1 = 2. If they do so, the next b could all play 2 + 2 = 1+ 3. Let us say the turn after this
is turn 3b, changing what we call turn 0 to make this the case.
Now assume the opposing players have a winning strategy. In that case, after this, there
would be a winning strategy from the resultant state for an alliance that goes when the opposed
players do. In particular, this alliance goes on turns 3b+p1, 3b+p2, 3b+p3, . . . , 3b+pn, where
p1, p2, . . . are some numbers selected to make this the case.
Now, note that the 3b players can instead play as follows: the first b players can all play
1 + 1 = 2 and the next b players can all play 1 + 2 = 3, resulting in the same state as the one
we got to after all 3b players last time.
As such, the same strategy as the one used previously gives the win to the alliance that goes
on turns 2b+p1, 2b+p2, 2b+p3, . . . , 2b+pn. By assumption, alliance a has all players b before a
player from the opposition. We know the players with turns 3b+p1, 3b+p2, 3b+p3, . . . , 3b+pn
are opposed to alliance a, so the players with turns 2b+ p1, 2b+ p2, 2b+ p3, . . . , 2b+ pn must
be on alliance a.
As such, this would be a winning strategy for alliance a, contradicting the assumption that
the opposed players have a winning strategy. As such, alliance a must have a winning strategy.
2.7. Proof Of Theorem 1.10. Let the 2d players in the big alliance all do 1 + 1 = 2 for
the first d rounds (one round means every player takes a move, and we define the first round
starting from the big alliance’s first move).
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If in any of the first d round, the d consecutive players in the small alliance all do 2+2 = 1+3,
then we can directly let the second half of the 2d players in the big alliance (which is d
consecutive players) all do 1 + 2 = 3 instead in the next round.
In this case, suppose that small alliance has a winning strategy. Then for any winning path,
there exists a player q from the small alliance who takes the last step.
Note that player q belongs to small alliance, so player q − d belongs to big alliance. Since
player q’s last winning step becomes player q − d’s last step, so the big alliance now has the
winning strategy, which contradicts with our assumption.
Otherwise, if in each of the first d rounds, there is at least one player from small alliance
who does not take 2 + 2 = 1 + 3, which means that this step will take away at most one 2.
Then there will be at least one 2 generated in each round.
As a result, after d rounds, there are at least d 2’s generated for the stealing. After that, in
the (d + 1)th round, we can let the first half of the players in big alliance (which are the first
d consecutive players) all do 1 + 1 = 2, and the second half of the big alliance (which are last
d consecutive players) all do 2 + 2 = 1 + 3.
In this case, suppose that the small alliance has a winning strategy. Then for any winning
path, there exists a player q from the small alliance who takes the last step.
Note that player q belongs to the small alliance, so player q − d belongs to big alliance. In
this round, the first half of the big alliance (which are first the d consecutive players) can all
do 1 + 2 = 3 instead, so player q’s last winning step becomes player q − d’s last step. As a
result, the big alliance now has the winning strategy, which contradicts with our assumption.
Therefore, the big alliance always has a winning strategy, so we have proved this theorem.
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